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Reputation in Marketing Channels: Repeated-Transactions Bargaining
With Two-Sided Uncertainty
Abstract
Marketing channel interactions typically feature three characteristics that have not been incorporated together
in an analytic study: (1) the parties can do business repeatedly over time, often under different terms of trade
(e.g., prices may vary), (2) the terms that the seller offers one buyer may be different from those she offers
another, giving each interaction the flavor of bilateral monopoly bargaining, and (3) the buyer and seller come
to the interaction uncertain about the valuations each holds for the good, but they do know each other's for
valuation. The seller might, for example, come to the bargaining table aware that the buyer has a strong
reputation for being willing to pay only low prices, and the buyer might come aware that the seller is strongly
reputed for high cost and is, therefore, willing to offer only high prices. The latter characteristic raises an
interesting question: When engaged in a marketing channel interaction, what type of reputation is best for a
buyer or seller to take to the bargaining table? In this paper, we answer that question by incorporating each of
the characteristics that typify channel interactions in a formal game-theoretic bargaining model. We
determine how the reputations that buyers and sellers bring to the bargaining table affect their equilibrium
strategies and payoffs. Our analysis shows that, in general, the best reputation for the seller to take to the
bargaining table is one that makes the buyer nearly certain in his belief that the seller's cost is high, a result that
matches intuition. The best reputation for the buyer, however, is counterintuitive. We show that an increase in
the buyer's reputed willingness to pay can actually cause the seller to offer a price. The best reputation for the
buyer to take to the bargaining table is, therefore, one that makes the seller believe that there is a significant
chance that he is willing to pay a high price. This result is new to the literature and brings with it immediate
managerial implications that we discuss. Our analysis also shows that modeling the buyer as a forward-looking
strategic player yields different results than does following the normal convention of modeling the buyer as a
nonstrategic price-taker. We discuss why future research on channels and on reference-dependent utility
theory should consider these differences.
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Technical Appendix: The Proofs 
 In this appendix we prove the lemmas and propositions stated in Appendix 2.  The proofs focus primarily on 
the parties’ first period strategies.  This is because the second period strategies are so simple.  Recall that in the 
second period the parties’ optimal strategies are as outlined in §2 when both seller and buyer are myopic.  That is, 
the buyer accepts any offer up to his valuation; if the seller’s cost is low she offers  if optimistic and v  if 
pessimistic; and whatever the buyer’s reputation, the seller offers v  if her cost is high. 
+v −
+
 
 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.  The key to proving this result is demonstrating the effect of B’s updated belief, 
), about S’s cost on his expected payoff.  This is key because, as the results of §2 show, S’s period 2 offer will 
vary depending on her cost.  If S’s cost is high, then the second period offer will be v .  If S’s cost is low, then the 
second period offer will be v  if , and it will be  if 
( 101 ,pbb
+
− ( ) oββ ≤•1 +v ( ) oββ ≥•1 .  Therefore, on observing 1, B’s 
maximum expected payoff should he reject it is 
p
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]101 ,1 pbb− δ11 ,0 vps = −v −+ , which means that accepting any  
such that 
1p
( ) ( )[ ]δ1011 ,1 pbbvvpv −−≥− −++                                                               (A.9) 
provides B with a payoff at least as large as any that he can expect should he reject it.  Rearranging terms shows that 
any • satisfies Cdn. (A.9).  Clearly, then, if •  the (high valuation) buyer accepts, i.e.,  for .  
But suppose that  and that for this price 
≤ pp1 < pp1 ( ) 111 =∗ py •< pp1
•= pp1 ( ) 111 <p
•= pp1
≤p1
y .  Then S (in general) does better to reduce her price just 
slightly to exploit the fact that B certainly accepts the reduced price.  This, of course, increases B’s payoff, making 
him better off.  So it is clear that ) for .( ) [ 1,011 ∈∗ py
( )11 =∗ py
a  Having established this result, we will henceforth ignore it 
for analytic convenience.  With continuous prices S can set her price arbitrarily close to , so the result has no 
qualitative impact here.
•p
b  Therefore,  for all . 1 •p
 We now show that certain acceptance of any • is suboptimal.  Suppose that  and that > pp1 •>′= ppp1 ( ) 111 =∗ py  
for ′.  As , B’s acceptance reveals his type, which means that pp =1 −• ≥>′ vpp ( )( )βκ∗ •, 12p κ∀= +,v .  B’s payoff is then 
′, which by the definition of , is less than ( ) vp =′ +, ps −11 •p ( ) ( )[ ]δpbbv ′−− −+ ,1 01v
p
.  This means that his payoff is less 
than the maximum that he can expect from rejecting ′ .  Recall that he expects this maximum iff 
( ) ( )( ) −= v−∗ •p 12 , βκ⇔1β ≤• β o .  If  for ( )11∗ py 1= pp ′=1 , then S’s posterior belief (i.e., B’s posterior reputation) is 
                                                 
a Thanks to the Area Editor for pointing this out to us. 
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b This does not mean, however, that this result is unimportant.  In situations with discrete prices, especially if the price grid is 
coarse, this result can make a qualitative difference in the players’ strategies. 
( ) oβββ <=′ 0,1,, 101 ap
( )
 if a , as she is then convinced that she faces a low valuation buyer.  Then ( ) 01 =′p
( ) −−∗ =• vp 12 ,βκ , and B has increased his expected payoff by rejecting p′ , a contradiction. 
•p
= pp1
=p1
•p
( , 101 =pb =1
+= vp1
+v
+= vp1 +• < vp
−>′= vpp1
( ) ( ) ( ( )( )b− • 11 1vvypvpys −+′′−=′′ ++,1 0=
=vp2 )(− 1
( ) ( ) )−+ −−v 1+ −≤′⇒′≥′′ vppspys 11 ,0,
( ) 011 =∗ py •>′= ppp1
( ) ( ) )[ ]{ 11 , κκπ ++ +−′′=′ ppyp δκ++ − ′′p
( ) ( ) )[ ]{ 11 , κκπ ++ −′′′′=′′ ppyp δκ++ −v )+κ
)
0<−′ +κp
) (+ <′ πκ, 1p
+
p
op
 Finally, we show that if  is “large” (i.e., if ), then B may not accept • with certainty.  
Specifically, B does not accept  with certainty if doing so induces a low cost S to offer v .  By the 
definition of  (see Eqn. (A.8) in Appendix 2),  means that an offer of  is a foolproof signal to B that S’s 
cost is high, i.e., b  for .  Suppose that 
+• =vp
+=v
= pp1
+• =v
+v
+
•p +v
) 1 ( ) 1=11∗ py
+v
 for .  Now suppose that B’s certain 
acceptance of  induces a low cost S to offer .  We see that B’s strategy ruins the signal value of an offer of 
 because the offer cannot prove to B that S’s cost is high if a low cost seller also makes it, i.e., then 
+• =vpp
( ) 1, 101 <pbb  for 
.  Then , which implies that ( )11∗ py 1<  for , a contradiction.     +v=p1
 
 PROOF OF COROLLARY 1.  Take arbitrary  and suppose that •>′= ppp1 ( ) 011 >′=∗ ypy  for ′.  Then, 
because , the seller offers  if the period 1 offer is accepted whatever her cost, but if the first offer is 
rejected a pessimistic low cost seller offers .  The buyer’s expected payoff is thus 
pp =1
+=vp2
−=vp2
) ( )δy′−− .  Now suppose that ( )11∗ py  for pp ′=1 .  Then a pessimistic low cost 
seller offers − and the buyer’s expected payoff is ( ) ( ( ))•− 1b−= + vv′1 ,0 ps .  Comparing the payoffs, we find that 
( ( )( ) =•b δ1 •pv , a contradiction.  Hence, when the seller is initially pessimistic, 
 for .     
 
 PROOF OF LEMMA 1.  (i) To prove that a high cost S offers no price below cost, we need to show that doing 
so cannot maximize her payoff.  Consider any ( )+−∈′ κ,vp , a high cost S’s payoff from which is 
( ( )[ ]( ) } 011 β′−+ pyv δκ++ −v  and any [ ]++∈ v,κ , the payoff from which is 
( ( )[ ]( ) } 011 β−++ py δκ++ −′′ v .  ( ( )+′′≥ κπ ,1 p′π ,1 p  requires  
( ) ( )( + +−′ −′′′′≤′ κ κp ppypy 11 .                                                                 (A.10) 
As , Cdn. (A.10) can be satisfied iff ( ) −∗ >∀= vpp 111 ,0y , which can be satisfied iff 00 =β  or ( ) 0, 101 =pbb , the 
former of which is ruled out by assumption and the latter is a contradiction (if S’s cost is high B cannot know that her 
cost is low).  Therefore, ( )+′′ κπ ,1 p , which means offering a price below her cost is strictly dominated for a 
high cost seller. 
 We now consider >κp  (we now know that we need not consider any ).  To prove that a high cost 
S offers no price below , the key is to show that B will accept  if a high cost S is willing to offer it because his 
posterior belief is at least as large as his prior belief.
o
o
+< κ1p
op
c  Assume that  is not dominated by any higher first period 
                                                 
c Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for calling this, the most direct route to proving this part of the result, to our 
attention. 
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offer for a high cost S.  Then, if , B’s updated belief is at least as large as his prior, i.e., b , unless o 
is dominated by some lower price for a high cost S.  But as 
opp =1 ( ) 0101 , bpb ≥ p
( ) 0101 , bpb ≥
opp =1
b  for  implies that  (see 
Eqns. (5) and (A.8)), by Proposition 1 we know that B accepts .  So, no lower price can dominate  for a 
high cost S since no such price can be accepted with any larger probability by a high valuation B, the only type B 
with which a high cost S can trade.  Hence, a high cost S never prices below  and, having already shown that she 
never prices below cost, we have proved that she never prices below 
opp =1
op
•≤= ppp o1
po
{ }+κ,opmax . 
min
minp
+< κ1p
op
minp
minp
( )min, pv−
( )δκ−π −v ,1 minp
] (βδ 0 + v ( ) ( )−−− >πκπ ,1 v 1
β
min
1 vp = − p<
( )[ ( ) ( )[ ]β01 p′κ0 1v −+ −−1 py ′= y− ( )p′1
) ( )−−− > κπκ ,, 1 v ( ) ( )1 ′py <−+− −+−
−−
δ
κ
vv
v
)minp p
minp
minp
min
1 pp <
( ) 0, =pb
 (ii) To prove that on seeing any { }1 ,max ppp =< +κo  B concludes that S’s cost is low, we show that only a 
low cost seller is willing to offer such a price.  We know by part (i) that for a high cost S any  is dominated 
by any higher offer no matter how B responds to the lower or the higher offer and that it cannot benefit her to offer 
any  since B will accept  if she is willing to offer it.  We proceed by showing that a low cost S may be 
willing to offer  even if a high valuation B is certain to accept .  Then we show that if B is not 
certain to accept , which implies that even if B were certain to accept  it would be dominated by some 
higher offer for a high cost S (recall that, by part (i), B accepts  unless it is dominated by some higher offer for a 
high cost S), a low cost S may be willing to offer some 
opp <1
min
1 pvp <= −
minp
1p ∈ .  A low cost S’s payoff from take-the-sure-
thing, i.e., offer , is min1 pvp <= − ) (κκ −−−− −+−= vv , and her expected payoff from offering  is 
( ) ( )[ )( )δβκ 01−− −−κκmin −+− +− vκmin, −π1 = −pp  if B is certain to accept.  We find that κ,minp  
if ( ) 0min0 < p >−+− −+
−−
δ
κ
vv− −κβ
v , which defines a set of admissible values of 0 .  Hence, for admissible values of S’s 
initial belief about the buyer, 0β , a low cost S is willing to offer  no matter how B responds to the 
higher offer.  Now suppose that B does not accept  with certainty.  A low cost S’s expected payoff from offering 
some 
minp
( )min, pv−p ∈′  is ( ) ( ) ] δ
p1
βδκκ vp −+−′ −+−κπ1 ,p′ −
p
, where  is the probability 
with which B accepts ′ .  Comparing this payoff with a low cost S’s payoff from  (which is an offer that we 
have established her willingness to make) reveals that 
y
−= v
( ′π1 p  if 10 ′> p −κβ , which 
defines a set of admissible values of the product ( ) 01 βpy ′ .  Hence, for admissible values of S’s initial belief, 0β , and 
B’s response, , to ( )p′1y ( ,−vp ∈′ , a low cost S is willing to offer such ′ .  We have thus shown that there exist 
conditions under which a low cost S will choose  and conditions under which she will choose 1 vp <= −
( )min, pv−1 ∈p .  Having shown in part (i) that there are no conditions under which a high cost S offers any , 
we have established that only a low cost S can benefit from making any such offer.  The Intuitive Criterion is 
therefore invoked to assign zero weight to the likelihood that any  is offered by a high cost S.  Hence, on 
seeing any such offer, B concludes that S’s cost is low, i.e., 
1 p<
101b .     
 
 PROOF OF LEMMA 2.  (i) Observe that  if −• = pp ( ) 01 =•b  (see Eqns. (6) and (A.8)).  Then,  for all 
values of b  and, by Proposition 1, the buyer optimally accepts. 
•− ≤ pp
( )•1
 4
 (ii) Given that the buyer is certain to accept , it is clear that no −p ( )−−∈ pvp ,1  is optimal for either seller type 
whatever the buyer’s reputation.  Then, we need only compare an optimistic low cost seller’s payoff from , −= pp1
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( βκβδκκκπ 001 1, −−+−+−= −−−+−−−− vvpp ) δ , with that from , −v=p1 ( ) ( ) 0βδ1 ,κπ −−v κκ −+−− −+−= vv .  We 
find that ( ) ( ) oββκπκπ ≤⇒≤ −−−− 011 ,, vp , a contradiction if the seller is optimistic.     
 
 PROOF OF LEMMA 3.  By Lemma 1, ( ) min1101 for0, pppb <=b .  This means that if ( )min1 , ppp −∈ , then 
.  By Corollary 1, we know that B rejects any such price when S is pessimistic. •> pp1
 (i) The condition that defines hyper pessimism is ( ) ( ) ( ]+−−−− ∈′∀′> vvppv ,,,, 11 κπκπ
−
+v
, irrespective of B’s 
response to .  That is, a hyper pessimistic low cost S’s expected payoff from v  exceeds that from any price that 
B will accept, even if (a high valuation) B is certain to accept .  Then, by the Intuitive Criterion, we have 
 for any 
p′
( ) 1, 101 =pbb [ ]+∈ vpp ,min1
( ) 111 =∗ py
 that B’s strategy makes optimal for a high cost S, which implies that  
and, by Proposition 1,  for any such price.  By Proposition 1 we know that this means that B optimally 
accepts  with certainty, which makes  the optimal offer for a hyper pessimistic high cost S. 
+• =≤ vpp1
+= v• =pp1 +v
 Note that B’s certain acceptance of v  makes all + [ )+∈ vpp ,min1  suboptimal for both S types whatever 
posterior beliefs and responses such offers induce.  So the Intuitive Criterion has no bite for these prices.  We 
assume that b  for any such price, which, by Proposition 1, implies that ( ) 1, 101 =pb ( ) 111 =∗ py  for all such prices (this has 
no effect on S’s strategy). 
 (ii) The condition that defines a very pessimistic S is ( ) ( ) ( ]+−−−− ∈′∀′> pvppv ,,,, 11 κπκπ
−
, whatever B’s 
response to .  That is, a very pessimistic low cost S’s expected payoff from v  exceeds that from any price up to 
(though not beyond) .  The key to proving this part of the lemma is showing that B’s threat of certain rejection of 
all  is credible when S is very pessimistic. 
p′
+p
+> pp1
 We first show that B’s best response to  is to accept with certainty.  This is easy to see, as, given the 
above-stated relationship between the payoffs from v  and , we have 
+= pp1
− +p ( ) 1, 101 =pbb  for  by the Intuitive 
Criterion.  This means that  and, by Proposition 1, 
+= pp1
+• =< vpp1 ( ) 111 =∗ py  for . += pp1
 Next, consider some pp .  Of course, B would like to force S to avoid such prices, if he can.  We show that 
his threat to reject all such offers does force S to avoid these prices if it is credible, and then we show that the threat 
is credible.  First, note that no  is dominated for either S type if B accepts with large enough probability, as 
then, by the definition of , a very pessimistic low cost S (as well as a high cost S) is willing to offer such a price.  
Second, note that if B is certain to reject all , then all such prices are dominated by v  for a low cost S.  Last, 
note that B’s certain rejection of  makes any such price (at least weakly) dominated for a high cost S by all 
+>1
>p1
p1
+p
>
+p
+> pp1 −
+p
[ ]+∈ ppp ,min1 , as from any of the latter she gets trade with positive probability and non-negative profit.  Hence, if 
credible, B’s threat to reject all  renders all such prices suboptimal for both S types and, therefore, zero 
probability prices.  Since both S types will consider  if B accepts with large enough probability, we cannot 
+p>p1
+> pp1
 5
invoke the Intuitive Criterion to assign zero weight to either S type when .  So for any such price +> pp1 ( )101 , bpb 0b = , 
meaning that , and, by Corollary 1, 1pppp <<= +• o ( ) 011 =∗ py .  B’s rejection threat is, thus, credible. 
[ )+pp ,min
(1∗y
(1 ,p′ −κπ p′
opp >1
ppp =≥• 1
p
+p+> pp1
pp =1
( )11∗ py
o ( )101 ,pb op
+κ
≥1p
+
ppp ≤<= +• κo 1∗y
                                                
=ββ0
op
o
op
 B’s certain acceptance of  makes all +p ∈p1
) 11
 suboptimal for both S types whatever B’s posterior 
beliefs and responses.  We assume that ( ,01 =pbb  and, by Proposition 1, that ) 11 =p  for these zero probability 
prices (with no effect on S’s strategy). 
 (iii) The condition that defines moderate pessimism is ( ) ) min1 ,, ppv ≥′∀<−− κπ  if B accepts  with 
sufficiently large probability.  That is, a moderately pessimistic low cost S is willing to set any price that a high cost 
S is willing to set, given that B accepts the price with large enough probability. 
 (a) The situation here is that .  The key to proving this part of the lemma is to show that B’s threatened 
certain rejection of all  is credible when S is moderately pessimistic and .  Fortunately, it is easy to see 
that the arguments in support of the credibility of B’s threat are precisely the same as those expressed above in 
support of the credibility of his threat to reject all .  Simply replace  with , and the same results hold.  
Then, because a moderately pessimistic high cost S prefers  to any higher price, we have b  for o, 
which means that  and, by Proposition 1, 
+≥κop
+≥κo
op
op ( ) 0101 , bpb ≥
o 1=  for .  Then, by the definition of moderate 
pessimism,  is also optimal for a low cost S, and 
opp =1
p 0bb = , , and p == •1p ( ) 1=11∗ py  for , as required.opp =1 d  
We have established B’s beliefs on observing and best responses to lower prices in Lemmas 1 and 2. 
 (b) Here the situation is that .  Proving this part of the lemma involves several steps.  We must first 
show that B’s optimal strategy is such that no  is optimal for a low cost S.  Second, we must show that B’s 
strategy must make v  the optimal price for a high cost S but not for a low cost S, which imposes an upper bound 
on the probability with which B can accept .  Last, we must show that the lower limit on the probability with 
which B optimally accepts v  is positive. 
+<κop
≥1p
+v
+
 Suppose B’s optimal strategy is such that some  is optimal for both S types.  Then, for that price 
1.  By Corollary 1, we know 
+κ
( ) 0101 , bpbb ⇒= ( ) 01 =p  for any such price, a contradiction, as a 
pessimistic low cost S does better with  than she does with any price certain to be rejected.  It is clear that the −v
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d Note, however, that if the seller’s belief is at the boundary of moderate pessimism, i.e., if , then if her cost is low, the 
seller’s payoff from take-the-sure-thing equals her expected payoff from learn-then-discriminate by offering .  In such an 
instance, a low cost seller may randomize her first period offer, i.e., she may choose either v  or , both with positive 
probability.  Therefore, if , an offer of  need not necessarily be a pooling offer, and the buyer’s updated belief on 
observing it falls somewhere in the interval bounded below by the prior, b  (the buyer’s updated belief if the offer is pooling), 
and bounded above by 1 (the buyer’s updated belief if the offer is separating).  But even if , the buyer’s optimal strategy is 
unaffected.  Because his updated belief is at least as large as his prior on observing , it is still optimal for him to accept.  Most 
important, however, is that his updated belief on observing offers higher than  is unaffected.  That is, for , the updated 
buyer belief is the same as his prior because either type of seller would make such an offer if he accepts with sufficiently large 
probability.  His updated belief on observing any  supports the optimality of rejecting any such offer.  In any event, the 
case of  can be considered special, and as such we relegate its consideration to Proposition 4, which deals with all such 
special cases. 
−=ββ0
− p
−=ββ0
op
p >1
o
− op
0
op p
p >1
−=ββ0
same argument holds for any strategy such that any  is optimal for a low cost S but not for a high cost S, as 
then b , yielding the same contradiction.  We have thus shown that if , 
moderate pessimism implies B’s optimal responses to all  makes all such prices suboptimal for a low cost S. 
+≥κ1p
p
+
( ) ( ) 00, 111101 =⇒≤<=⇒= ∗+−• pyppppb κ
+≥κ1p
+<κop
+≥κ1
[ +∈p ,1 κ
( ,01 pb ) 11 =p
[ ++∈ v,κ
+≥κ1p
) ++ = vκ
−y ) −< yp1 p1
+= vp1
) 1, 1 =p +• =< vpp1
+
( ) 11 =p ) 01 >
+v ( )∗ py 11
( 0b01 ,b ∈p1
( ) 011 =∗ py
 We now show that B’s strategy must make v  the optimal price for a high cost S.  Suppose that B’s best 
responses to  are such that some )+v
1
 is optimal for a high cost S.  Then, as all  are suboptimal for 
a low cost S, for any such price we have 
+≥κ1p
) 1=b , implying that  and, by Proposition 1, that +• =< vpp1 (1∗y  for 
any such price.  This is a contradiction, as, by the definition of moderate pessimism, B’s certain acceptance of any  
price that a high cost S is willing to set makes such a price optimal for a low cost S as well, and we have already 
shown that no such price can be optimal for a low cost S.  B’s optimal strategy must, therefore, render all )p1  
suboptimal for both seller types.  Therefore, as some  must be optimal for a high cost S, it must be the case 
that the optimal strategy for B must be such that (∗1p .  Further, since a low cost S must not be tempted to offer 
this price, by the definition of , we know that (∗1y  for .  Then, we have +v= ( ) 11 =p,01 bb  for , as 
required. 
+= vp1
 We conclude our examination of B’s optimal strategy by showing that ( ) 011 >∗ py  for .  Suppose that B 
optimally rejects  with certainty.  Then a high cost S, anticipating his response, prices a bit lower than v .  
This reveals to B that S’s cost is high since a moderately pessimistic low cost S chooses no such price, and we have 
.  Then , which implies that 
+= vp1
( 01 bb 1∗y , which we have already ruled out.  Therefore, (1∗ py  for 
.  Together with the previous result, this means that =p1 ( )−∈ y,0  for , as required. += vp1
 Finally, we consider B’s posterior beliefs and responses on observing any [ )++∈ vp ,1 κ .  We have determined 
that all such prices must be suboptimal for both seller types.  We also know that if B accepts with large enough 
probability, either moderately pessimistic S type is willing to choose prices from this range.  So, we cannot use the 
Intuitive Criterion to place zero weight on either type if such a price is observed.  We assume that any such price 
yields no information about S’s type, i.e., )1pb =  for all [ )++ v,κ .e  Therefore, they all exceed  and, by 
Corollary 1,  for all such prices.  This renders all of them suboptimal for both S types, as required.     
•p
 
 PROOF OF COROLLARY 2.  The fundamental logic of Corollary 2 is owed to Fudenberg and Tirole (1983, pp. 
224 – 225) for .  We extend their logic, however, for the case of . +• ≤< vpp 1 +• == vpp1
 First, note that by the definition of , if the buyer’s response to any  is , then the seller’s posterior 
belief is  if the outcome is rejection.  A low cost seller is then indifferent between offering  and v  in the 
second period.  Next, note that for a mixed strategy to be optimal for the buyer, it is necessary that he be indifferent 
between accepting and rejecting the offer.  So let 
oy −>vp1 oy
oβ −v +
( )12 pη  be the probability with which an indifferent low cost seller 
offers  in period 2.  The buyer is indifferent between accepting and rejecting in period 1 if +v
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( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]δη 121011 1,1 ppbbvvpv −−−=− −++ .                                                  (A.11) 
 And from Eqn. (A.11) we get the period 2 strategy of a low cost seller that yields buyer indifference in period 1.  
Call that strategy . ( )12 p∗η
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]δη 101112 ,11 pbbvv
pvp −−
−−= −+
+
∗                                                       (A.12) 
 Now take some ( ]+•∈ vpp ,1 .  Suppose that for such a price ( ) oypy >∗ 11 .  Then, by Bayes’ rule (see Eqn. (A.1)) 
.  That is, if the observed outcome is a rejection of the price, S is made pessimistic and a low cost S then 
chooses , which, by Proposition 1, means that 
( ) oββ <• 0,1
p2
−=v ( ) 011 =∗ py , a contradiction.  Hence,  for all ( ) oypy ≤∗ 11 ( ]+•∈ vpp ,1 . 
 Now take some ( )+•∈ vpp ,1  and suppose that for such a price ( ) oypy <∗ 11
+= vp2
.  Then, by Bayes’ rule, .  
That is, whatever the observed outcome, S remains optimistic and  whatever her cost.  As such, B should 
accept the first period price with certainty, a contradiction.  Hence, 
( ) oββ >•1
( ) oypy =∗ 11  for any ( )+•∈ vpp ,1 . 
 But suppose that .  This means that a low cost S or both S types expect that pricing at v  is at least 
as profitable as any other strategy.  So, given that 
•+ >= pvp1 +
( ) oypy =∗ 11  for any ( )+•∈ vpp ,1 , if B’s best response to  is 
some , S reduces her price ever so slightly to exploit the fact that B accepts any lower price with larger 
probability.  Such a reduced price yields a positive surplus for B while not violating the conditions necessary for him 
to optimally play a mixed strategy (see Eqns. (A.11) and (A.12)).  Accepting v  with probability  yields the 
reservation utility, 0, for B, so it is clear that 
+v=p1
( ) oypy <∗ 11
+ oy
( ) [ )oy,01 ∈py1∗  for .  Note that this situation is similar to the 
case of  and, for the same reason, we will ignore this result (i.e., S can price arbitrarily close to ).  
Therefore,  for all 
•+ > p=vp1
•= pp1
( )py∗ 11
+v
oy= ( ]+v•∈ pp ,1 . 
 Finally, we consider the situation when  and show that in this situation .  By the 
definition of ,  means that a high cost S finds  an optimal price and a low cost S does not.  Therefore, 
 for .  This implies that v  is dominated by some lower price for a low cost S when B’s response to 
 is .  Suppose that B’s optimal strategy is such that some  is optimal for a high cost S but not for a low 
cost S.  Then, for such a price we have 
+• == vpp1
+v
) 1
( ) oypy ≥∗ 11
•p
p
+• =vp
+= v1( ) 1, 101 =pbb
+v oy
+
( ,01
+<vp1
1 =p
<
b
p1
b , implying that 1, which means that .  Then, 
however, this price is also optimal for an optimistic low cost S, as an optimistic low cost S is willing to set any price 
that a high cost S is willing to set if B is certain to accept such a price, a contradiction.  Hence, when S is optimistic 
B’s optimal strategy must be such that no  is optimal for a high cost S but not for a low cost S, i.e., 
pv >+p =• ( ) 11 =1∗ py
+v ( ) 0101 , bpbb ≤  
for any such price.  Then ( ) oypy =∗ 11  for, at minimum, any ( )+vp ,o∈p1  when S is optimistic.  Therefore, it cannot be 
the case that  for , as such a response makes it optimal for a high cost S but not a low cost S to price ( ) oyp <1y∗1 += vp1
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e Such uninformed off the equilibrium path beliefs have been called “passive conjectures” (Fudenberg and Tirole [1983]), and we 
use passive conjectures frequently in this analysis.  We should point out, however, that there are other ways of modeling such off 
the equilibium path beliefs (interested readers should see Cho and Kreps [1987]; Fudenberg and Tirole [1991]). 
just lower than v , which we have ruled out.  (If a low cost S is unwilling to price at v  when B’s response is , 
she cannot be willing to set any lower price when B’s response to that price is ).     
+ + oy
oy
)p ≥1
p
+κ,o
−
+β
= v1
+
pp ,−p1 0
+v
( )11 =b p <•
( )p∗ 11
p =o o
 
 PROOF OF LEMMA 4.  By Corollary 2 we know that when S is optimistic ( oyy∗1  for all  and that 
 for all 
+≤ vp1
( ) oypy =∗ 11 ( ]+•∈ vp ,1 . 
 (i) The conditions that define hyper optimism are ( ) ( )−+−− ≤ κπκπ ,, 11 vp  and ( ) ( )++≤ κππ ,11 vp  when v  is 
accepted with probability , even if  is certain to be accepted (recall that  is always accepted with certainty).  
To prove this part of the lemma we need to show that B’s optimal strategy must be such that no 
+
oy op p
( )+− vp ,
+
∈p1
v
 is 
optimal for either S type, from which it follows that  is optimal for both S types given the above-stated 
relationships between the payoffs.  We will then show that B’s best response to S’s optimal price, , is unique. 
+v=p1
 We first establish that if  a high cost S is not indifferent between offering v  and .  Let  so 
that a high cost S’s expected payoff from  equals that from  when the response to the former is  and the latter 
is accepted with certainty.  If she is indifferent between the two prices and if, in her indifference, she offers  
with positive probability, then B’s posterior belief on observing  is less than his prior and he does not accept 
 with certainty.  But then a high cost S is not indifferent between these two prices; rather, she prefers .  
Because we already know, by Lemma 1, that all o  are dominated for a high cost S, this result says that hyper 
optimism implies that all  are dominated for a high cost S.  Then for any 
+= ββ0
o
+ op =β0
p
= vp1
+v op oy
+
opp =1
op
pp <1
pp ≤1 ( ]o∈  we have ( , )101 =pbb , 
which means that  and, by Corollary 2, 1p<pp = •− ( )py∗ 11 oy=  for any such price.  But as  for all , it is 
immediately clear that no 
( ) ≥1 oypy∗1 ≤p1
( ]opp ,−p1∈  is optimal for either a low or a high cost hyper optimistic S. 
 Next consider ( )+vp ,1 o
( 101 ,pb =
∈p .  Suppose that B’s optimal strategy is such that some such price is optimal for both 
S types.  Then we have b , from which it follows that , which means that  for any such 
price.  The contradiction is clear, as  for .  Now suppose that B’s optimal strategy is such that some 
) 0b 1ppp <= •o ( ) oypy =∗ 11
( ) oypy ≥∗ 11 += vp1
( )+∈ vpp ,1 o  is optimal for a low cost S but not for a high cost S.  Then we have 0,0 pb , implying that , 
and therefore  for any such price, yielding the same contradiction.  Now suppose that B’s optimal strategy 
is such that some 
1pp =−
oyy =
( )+vp ,o
1pp >= •+
∈p1  is optimal for a high cost S but not for a low cost S.  Then we have b , from 
which it follows that v , meaning that 
( , 101 pb ) 1=
( ) 11 =p1∗y .  However, B’s certain acceptance of such a price also 
induces an optimistic low cost S to set that price, which means that ( ) b0b 101 ,pb = , and 1, and  for 
any such price, and the familiar contradiction reappears.  Hence, when S is hyper optimistic, B’s optimal strategy 
must be such that no 
p y∗1p <• ( ) yp =1
( )+∈ vpp ,1 o  is optimal for either S type. 
 We have shown that hyper optimism means that no ( )+−∈ vpp ,1  can be optimal for either S type.  From this 
result and Lemma 1, it immediately follows that ( ) +=+∗ vp κ1
+= vp1
.  We conclude our discussion of B’s optimal responses 
by showing that  is a unique best response to .  Recall that one of the conditions that define hyper optimism 
is 
oy
( ) ( )−+ κ,−− ≤πκπ , 11 vp  when B accepts v  with probability .  If, in fact, + oy ( ) ( )−+−− < κπκπ ,, 11 vp  then it is clear that 
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( ) 0101 , bpbb =  for , and .  Then B’s optimal response, , is unique as is a low cost S’s optimal price, += vp1 1ppp <= •o oy
( ) +=−∗ vp κ1 .  But suppose a low cost S is indifferent between  and += vp1 −= pp1  because ( ) ( )−+−− = κπκπ ,, 11 vp
+= vp1
+
 when B’s 
response to  is , i.e., .+v oy ++= ββ0 f  We know that the probability with which B must accept  is at least , 
but can he accept with any larger probability?  It is easy to see that he cannot, for accepting v  with any larger 
probability yields 
oy
( ) ( )−+< κπ ,1 v−− κ,π1 p  and a low cost S is not indifferent.  Therefore, B’s best response to v  is 
unique, .  This also means that B’s optimal strategy will leave a hyper optimistic low cost S indifferent between 
 and , i.e., 
+
oy
+v −p ( ) { }+v−,−∗p1 κ ∈ p , when it happens that .++= ββ0 g 
( +−∈ vpp ,1
+
×p
+
oy ( ) 0, 101 =pb
1ppp <= •− ( )p1 oy=y∗1
×p
opp >×
1ppp <= •o ( )py =∗ 11 oy [∈p1
( ) ( −+ κπ ,1 v− >− κπ ,1 p ) ( +++ ≤ κπκ ,, 1 vpo +
oy p
( +−∈ vp ,1p += vp1
op +
+y −= p1
β0
+ opp =1
opp ≤1
=p1 v
pp ,−p1
( ,0 pb ) 01 =1 pp <= •− ( )py =∗ 11 oy
                                                 
+++ > β
+β ++> β
+≥ ββ0β
+ −p
+ 1,0b
++= ββ0
 Finally, we consider B’s posterior beliefs on observing zero (prior) probability ) and his best 
responses to such prices.  It is clear that any price lower than  is dominated for a high cost S, for even if B accepts 
such a price with certainty, her expected payoff is smaller than that she expects from v  when B accepts v  with 
probability .  We invoke the Intuitive Criterion to set b  for any such price.  Given this belief, we have 
, implying  for any ( )×−∈ ppp ,1
( ) 0101 , bpb
, which makes any such price suboptimal for a low as well as a 
high cost S, as required.  The Intuitive Criterion loses its bite, however, for prices at least as high as  because 
such prices are not dominated for either S type if B accepts with sufficiently large probability.  We therefore assume 
that these prices are uninformative, i.e., b =  for all such prices.  Given this belief, and since , we have 
, so  for any )+v,×p , which makes any such price suboptimal for both S types, as required. 
 (ii) The conditions that define a very optimistic S are ) and ( )π1  when v  is 
accepted with probability , even if  is accepted with certainty.  Proving this part of the lemma requires us to 
show that all 
o
) must be suboptimal for both S types, from which it follows that  is optimal for a high 
cost S given the above-stated relationship between her payoffs from  and v .  We must also show that B’s 
response to a high cost S’s price must be smaller than , making p  the optimal price for a low cost S. 
 First, note that precisely the same result given above for the case of  also applies here, i.e., a high 
cost S strictly prefers  to  when the former is accepted with probability  and the latter is accepted 
with certainty.  Hence, all  are suboptimal for a very optimistic high cost S.  So, as before, for any 
+= β
oy
( ]o∈  
we have b , yielding , implying 1p  for any such price, rendering all such prices 
suboptimal for both S types. 
f Comparing Eqns. (A.3) and (A.6) reveals that  may take on a larger value than .  If , it is easy to show that the 
equilibria do not change.  If , then S cannot be very optimistic and she is hyper optimistic if . 
+β + +β
g And in her indifference, a low cost seller may randomize between v  and , which means that on observing a first period offer 
of v , the buyer’s updated belief need not be the same as his prior.  Rather, it falls somewhere in the interval [ ], depending 
upon the probability with which a low cost seller makes one or the other offer.  But, as shown above, the buyer’s strategy is 
unaffected by this.  The case of   is a special one, and we handle it in Proposition 4. 
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 Now consider ( )+∈ vp ,1 op .  Again, exactly the same arguments used to show that all prices in this interval 
must be suboptimal for both S types under hyper optimism also apply when S is very optimistic.  Therefore, B’s 
optimal strategy is such that all ( )+∈ vpp ,1 o  are suboptimal for a very optimistic S, which, together with the previous 
result, means that all ( )+−∈ vpp ,1  must be suboptimal for a very optimistic S. 
 Having established that when S is very optimistic B’s optimal strategy must be such that all ( )+−∈ vpp ,1  are 
suboptimal for both S types, it is clear that it must be the case that ( ) +=+∗ vp κ1 .  How should B respond to this price?  
Let us suppose that his optimal response is such that  is optimal for both S types (which means that , 
otherwise, by the definition of a very optimistic S, 
+v oyy >1
( ) ( )−κ, ++− >πκπ 1 v
0
−,1 p  and v  is not optimal for a low cost S).  But if 
 is optimal for both S types, we have b+v ( )101 , bpb =  for , implying that 1 , and therefore += vp1 ppp <= •o ( )py =∗ 11 oy
oy
.  
This is a contradiction, as v  is suboptimal for a very optimistic low cost S when B’s response to this price is .  
Therefore, B’s response to  must be such that this price is suboptimal for a low cost S, and by the definition of , 
this means that  for .  Since we know that seller optimism means that 
+
+v +y
( ) +∗ < ypy 11 += vp1 ( ) oyp ≥1y∗1  for , it must 
be the case that 
+= vp1
( ) [ )+y,∗ ∈ ypy 11 o  for this price.  Given B’s best response, we have ( ), 101 1=pbb  for , as required.  It 
is clear that the interval 
+= vp1
[ )+y,oy  always exists when S is very optimistic. 
 Finally, we consider B’s beliefs on observing and best responses to zero probability ( )+−∈ vpp ,1 .  We again 
invoke the Intuitive Criterion to set ( ) 0, 101 =pbb  for all , as all such prices are dominated by  for a high cost 
S.  And, again, as 
×< pp1 +v
[ )+×∈ vpp ,1  are not dominated for either S type if B accepts with large enough probability, these 
prices are uninformative and we set b ( ) 0101 , bpb =  for [ )+×∈ vp ,p1 .  Given these beliefs, B optimally accepts any 
( )+−∈ vpp ,1  with probability , making all such prices suboptimal for a very optimistic S of either type, as required.  oy
 (iii) The condition that defines moderate optimism is ( ) ( )+++ > κπκπ ,, 11 vpo  when B accepts  with probability 
 and he accepts  with certainty.  It is easy to show that this condition also implies that 
+v
oy op ( ) ( )−′> κππ ,11 ppo
( ) 11 =p p
−κ,
1
∗y
 for all 
.  Therefore, b  for , meaning that  and, by Proposition 1, that  for  
when S is moderately optimistic.   
op>p′ ( ) 010, bpb =1 opp =1 opp == •p1 op=1
 We now consider B’s beliefs on observing and best responses to zero probability prices.  By Lemma 1 we 
know that b  for any ( ) 0, 101 =pb ( )oppp ,1 −∈ , and, therefore ( ) oypy =∗ 11  for all such prices, by Corollary 2.  Then B’s best 
response to any ( )op,−pp1∈
pp >1
( )10, bpb =
 renders all such prices suboptimal for either S type, as required.  Because either S type is 
willing to set o if B accepts with sufficiently large probability, we assume that any such price is uninformative 
and set 0b  for any such price.  Given this belief, we know by Corollary 2 that 1 ( ) oypy =∗ 11  for all ( ]+∈ vpp ,1 o , 
which, by the definition of moderate optimism, makes all such prices suboptimal for both S types, as required.     
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The next three proofs are those of the equilibria given by Propositions 2, 3, and 4.  These proofs focus on 
showing that deviations from the stated equilibria are not profitable for the seller.  The logic underlying the buyer’s 
strategies is stated by the results that precede these three proofs, and when one of those results is used in the proof of 
one of the following propositions, we clearly reference it to help the reader understand why it applies in the current 
context. 
 
 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.  (i) By definition, if the seller is moderately pessimistic and , then a low 
cost seller’s expected payoff from offering any first period price that she would offer were her cost high, given that 
B is sufficiently likely to accept such a price, exceeds her payoff from take-the-sure-thing.  That is, 
−> ββ0
( ) ( ) min11 ,,, pppv ≥′∀′< −−− κπκπ  if B accepts p′  with sufficiently large probability.  She is moderately optimistic 
when a high cost seller’s expected payoff from offering o exceeds her expected payoff from offering v , i.e., p +
( ) ( )+++ > κπκπ ,, 11 vpo  if B accepts  with probability  and accepts  with certainty. +v oy op
 Let us first consider the case when the seller is moderately pessimistic and .  We know by Lemmas 
1, 2, and 3 that under such conditions B’s optimal strategy is as follows.  (1) Accept the first period price if it is o, 
in which case B’s updated belief about the seller is the same as his prior, i.e., 
+≥ κop
p
( )1 0bb =•  (see part iii.a of Lemma 3).  
(2) Reject if the first period price is higher than o, in which case B’s updated belief is the same as his prior, i.e., 
 (see part iii.a of Lemma 3).  (3) Reject if the first period price is in the interval 
p
( ) 01 bb =• ( )op,p − , in which case B 
concludes that the seller’s cost is low, i.e., ( )1 0=•b , because, by Lemma 1, we know that  means that 
, and that if the seller’s cost is high she never offers a price below .  (4) Accept if the first period 
price is less than or equal to , which, by Lemma 2, we know B accepts whatever his belief. 
+≥ κop
minpp =o minp
−p
 Consider a deviation by the seller.  Can she profit by deviating to a lower first period offer?  By Lemma 1 we 
know that it is never profitable for the seller to offer any min1 ppp =< o  if her cost is high.  Now consider whether the 
seller would profit from offering some o  if her cost is low.  Given B’s certain acceptance of  (if his valuation 
is high), it is clear that the seller cannot profit from offering any 
pp <1 op
( )op,−vp1∈
op=min
p
, as at any such price her margin is lower 
and the likelihood of its acceptance is no greater.  And by the definition of moderate pessimism, if the seller’s cost is 
low her expected payoff is larger if she offers any  than it is if she offers v  (or any price lower than v  
since no price is accepted with greater likelihood) when B accepts 
pp ≥′ − −
′ with sufficiently large probability.  But here B 
is certain to accept .  Therefore, whether her cost is low or high, it is not profitable for the seller to deviate to 
any . 
opp =′
opp <1
 Can the seller profit by deviating to a higher first period offer?  To see that she cannot we note that the proof 
of Lemma 3 shows that B’s threat to reject any  is credible, so any such price is certain to be rejected.  Now, 
observe that if B rejects such a price, then if a moderately pessimistic low cost seller makes such an offer her payoff 
is 
opp >1
( )δκ−− −+ v0 , and it is easy to show that this is smaller than ( )[ ] ( )( )δβκβδκκ 00 1−−+−+− −−−+− vvpo
p
, the expected 
payoff that is hers if she learns-then-discriminates by offering o.  And it is even easier to see that B’s rejection of 
any  means that a high cost seller’s expected payoff from offering such a price, opp >1 ( ) δβκ 0++ −+ v0 , can be no 
larger than her payoff from offering , which is op ( )[ ] 0.  Therefore, whether her cost is low or high, it 
is not profitable for the seller to deviate to any o. 
βδκ+−κ ++ + v−po
pp >1
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 Now consider the case when the seller is moderately optimistic.  We know by Lemmas 1, 2, and 4 that under 
this condition B’s optimal strategy is as follows.  (1) Accept the first period price if it is o, in which case B’s 
updated belief about the seller is the same as his prior, i.e., 
p
( ) 01 bb =• .  (2) Accept with probability  if the first 
period price is in the interval 
oy
( )opp ,− , in which case B’s updated belief is ( ) 01 =•b  because moderate optimism does 
not exist unless , and, by Lemma 1, we know that if the seller’s cost is high she never offers a price below 
.
opp =min
minp h  (3) Accept with probability  if the first period price is in the interval oy ( ]+v,p o , in which case B’s updated 
belief is the same as his prior (see part iii of Lemma 4).  (4) Accept if the first period price is less than or equal to 
, which, by Lemma 2, we know B accepts whatever his belief. −p
 Consider a deviation to a lower first period offer.  Again, by Lemma 1 we know that no min1 ppp =< o
op
 can be 
profitable for the seller if her cost is high.  If the seller’s cost is low, then, again, as B is certain to accept  (if his 
valuation is high), deviating to any [ )oppp ,1 −∈  is not profitable, as at any such price her margin is lower and the 
likelihood of its acceptance is no greater.  And, by Lemma 2.ii, we know that if the seller’s cost is low, optimism (of 
any degree) implies that her expected payoff from offering  exceeds that from offering any lower price; thus, if no −p
[ )oppp ,1 −∈  is a profitable deviation, neither can be any . −p<p1
 Consider a deviation to a higher period 1 offer.  By the definition of moderate pessimism, we know that if the 
seller’s cost is high her expected payoff from offering  exceeds that from offering v  when B is certain to accept 
the former and accepts the latter with probability , as is the case here.  Further, because here B accepts any price 
in 
op +
oy
( ]+vp ,o  with probability , it is clear that if the seller’s cost is high she cannot profit from deviating to any price 
higher than . 
oy
op
 Next we show that the seller does not profit by deviating to a higher first period offer if her cost is low.  To 
do so, we need to show that if a high cost seller’s payoff from o is larger than it is from v  (and, hence, any offer in p +
( ]+vp ,o ), then the same is true about a low cost seller’s payoff.  If the seller’s cost is low, then straightforward 
algebra shows that her expected payoff from playing learn-then-discriminate by offering  exceeds that from 
gambling by offering v  (when B is certain to accept  and accepts v  with probability ) if 
op
oy+ op +
( )[ ] ( )( ) −−
−−−−−
′≡−+−− y
v
vv
0
0
βκ
δκβδκ
+ −
−κ< py
o
o .  By comparison, if the seller’s cost is high the same sort of 
comparison reveals that her expected payoff is higher from offering  than it is from offering v  if op +
+
+
+
′≡−
− yκ
κ −′y
+′y
+ oy
+< v
py
o
o
op
.  Now observe that if , the value of  below which a low cost seller’s payoff is larger from 
, is larger than , a high cost seller’s threshold, it means that a low cost seller’s payoff from from  exceeds 
that from v  for all values of  where the same holds for a high cost seller.  Notice that  is a function of 
oy
op
−′y 0β , 
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h The seller is moderately optimistic when .  But if , then Eqn. (A.3) shows that , 
so the seller cannot be moderately optimistic. 
+<< βββ 0o +=⇔≠ κminmin ppp o oββ =+
while  is not.  It is easy to show that  decreases in +′y −′y 0β .  Thus, the smallest value of  is its value when −′y 0β  
approaches 1, in which case  approaches −′y −+
−
−
−
κ
κ
v
p o
+′y
, its infimum, and inf  implies that all  exceed .  
Straightforward algebra shows that inf  requires that v , which requires that either b  or 
+− ′>′ yy −′y
1
+′y
0− ≤′y op≤+ 0 = =δ  or 
, all of which are ruled out by assumption.  Therefore, , which implies that a low cost seller does not 
deviate to a first period offer higher than  if a high cost seller does not, and we have already established that a 
moderately optimistic high cost seller does not. 
+
+v
− =vv
−p
+′− >′ yy
op
++β
+
oy
0
op
β ++> ββ
+ −p
( +v−∈ pp ,1 oy
( )1 • 0b
−≤ pp1
( +− vp ,∈p1
+ { minp,maxpp <− o
−p
−p
oy
− +
+
+
0
− +
 (ii) By the definition of hyper optimism, the seller is hyper optimistic when , and both of the 
following conditions hold.  (1) A low cost seller’s expected payoff from playing learn-then-discriminate by offering 
, which B is certain to accept, is no more than is her expected payoff from gambling by offering v , when B 
accepts  with probability .  (2) A high cost seller’s expected payoff from offering v , which B accepts with 
probability , is at least as large as is her expected payoff from offering  if B accepts with certainty.  Observe 
that because  increases in 
≥β 0
+
oy
yo , it follows that the strict inequality, , implies that a low cost seller’s 
payoff from gambling by offering v  strictly exceeds her payoff from learn-then-discriminate with an offer of . 
0
 By Lemma 4.i we know that B optimally accepts all ] with probability  when the seller is hyper 
optimistic, in which case his updated belief about the seller is the same as his prior, i.e., b .  And, whatever his 
or the seller’s belief, we know by Lemma 2 that B is certain to accept any . 
=
 Consider a deviation by the seller to a lower first period offer.  It is clear that no deviation to any )  
can be profitable for the seller whether her cost is low or high since no such offer is accepted with any greater 
probability than is v , and all yield smaller margins.  B is certain to accept an offer of , yet the expected payoff for 
a low cost seller is less than that she expects from an offer of v , and as 
+ −p
}=+κ , we know by Lemma 1 
that a high cost seller does not profitably deviate to  (or any lower offer).  And, by Lemma 2, we know that, when 
optimistic, a low cost seller’s expected payoff from  exceeds that from any lower offer, implying that the payoff 
from all prices lower than  are smaller than is that from v .  Hence, whatever her cost, a hyper optimistic seller 
does not profitably deviate to a first period offer lower than v . 
p
 It is clear that a deviation to a price higher than v  cannot be profitable since at any such price there is certain 
rejection, while  is accepted with probability .     +=vp1 >
 
 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.  (i) By definition the seller is hyper pessimistic if a low cost seller’s payoff from 
take-the-sure-thing (i.e., making a first period offer of v ) exceeds that from any offer up to and including v , 
whatever B’s response to the higher offer.  We know by Lemma 3 that when the seller is hyper pessimistic B’s 
optimal strategy is as follows.  (1) Accept the first period price if it is in the interval [ ]+vp ,min , in which case B’s 
updated belief about the seller is b  (i.e., B takes any such offer as conclusive evidence that the seller’s cost is 
high).  (2) Reject if 
( ) 11 =•
( )min1 ,ppp −∈ , in which case B’s updated belief is ( ) 01 =•b  (i.e., B takes all such offers as proof that 
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the seller’s cost is low because they are lower than minp , the lowest offer that a high cost seller would ever make).  
(3) Accept if , which, by Lemma 2, we know B accepts whatever his belief. −≤ pp1
+v
+
+
+
κ−− −
) ]βδκ 0−
+pp ,min
( min,pp−
+p
p
p1
)δκ−
]+p ]β0 +
 Consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is high.  It is clear that it is not profitable for her to deviate to 
any [ )∈ pp ,min1 , as no such price is accepted with any greater likelihood than is v  and all yield lower margins.  And 
because we know by Lemma 1 that she does not profitably deviate to any 
+
min
1 pp < , we can conclude that the seller 
does not profit from a deviation to a price lower than v  if her cost is high.  It is also clear that deviating to a price 
higher than v  does not pay, for at any such price there is no chance of trade, while at v  there is trade yielding a 
positive margin with positive probability.  Therefore, a hyper optimistic high cost seller does not profitably deviate 
from offering v . 
+
 Now consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is low.  As no offer is accepted with any greater likelihood 
than is , offering a lower price cannot be more profitable.  It is easy to show that, when hyper pessimistic, take-
the-sure-thing, the payoff from which is 
−v
( )δκ−− +− vv , dominates offering any , the payoff from which is +>vp1
( )δ−+ v0 κ−− , and at least weakly dominates offering any [ ]+∈′ vp ,minp , the payoff from which is 
([ ( )( )δβκ 01−−+ −−vκ −−′ +−p + v .  Hence, when hyper pessimistic, a low cost seller does not optimally deviate 
from take-the-sure-thing. 
 (ii) By definition the seller is very pessimistic if a low cost seller’s payoff from take-the-sure-thing exceeds 
that from offering any price in the interval ( ]+− pv , , no matter how B responds to such a price.  By Lemma 3 we know 
that when the seller is very pessimistic B’s optimal strategy is as follows.  (1) Accept the first period price if it is in 
the interval [ ], in which case B’s updated belief about the seller is ( ) 11 =•b  (i.e., B takes any such offer as proof 
that the seller’s cost is high).  (2) Reject if , in which case B’s updated belief is the same as his prior.  (3) 
Reject if 
+> pp1
)1p ∈ , in which case B’s updated belief is ( ) 01 =•b  (i.e., B takes all such offers as proof that the 
seller’s cost is low because they are lower than minp ).  (4) Accept if . −p≤p1
 Consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is high.  Because no [ )+∈ ppp ,min1  is accepted with any greater 
likelihood than is , and all yield smaller margins, it is clear that a high cost seller does not profit by deviating to 
any such price.  And by Lemma 1 we know that she does not profitably to any min1 pp < .  Hence, a very pessimistic 
high cost seller makes no first period offer lower than .  Might she make a higher first period offer?  Lemma 3 
shows that B’s threat to reject any  is credible when the seller is very pessimistic.  Therefore, offering any 
+
+> pp1
[ ]+∈ ppp ,min1  (at least weakly) dominates offering any , as at any of the former there is trade yielding non-
negative margins with positive probability while at any of the latter there is no chance of trade. 
+p>
 Consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is low.  It is by now clear that she does not profitably deviate to 
any offer lower than .  It is easy to show that, when very pessimistic, take-the-sure-thing, which pays her −v
(κ −−− −+− vv , dominates offering any , which pays +> pp1 ( )δκ−− −+ v0 , and at least weakly dominates offering 
any [∈′ pp ,min , which pays her ( )[ ( )( )δβ01−κδκ −+−′ −−− vp κ− −+v .  Hence, a very pessimistic low cost seller 
does not profitably deviate from take-the-sure-thing. 
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 (iii) First, recall that moderate pessimism is the condition under which ( ) ( ) min11 ,,, pppv ≥′∀′< −−− κπκπ
+=κminp
 if B 
accepts  with sufficiently large probability.  Second, recall that  means that .  Together, these 
mean that if the seller’s cost is high, she is willing to consider first period offers in the interval 
p′ +< κop
[ ]++ v,κ
op
+
−<< yy1 −y
+v
+=vp1
, and if her cost 
is low, she will also consider making offers from the same interval if B accepts with large enough probability.  
Therefore, any offer that the seller would make if her cost is high will be a pooling offer if B accepts with 
sufficiently large probability.  But notice that the highest pooling offer that B is certain to accept, , is 
unacceptable to the seller if her cost is high because here  and .  Therefore, there is no price that a 
high cost seller is willing to offer that B can optimally accept with certainty (see Lemma 3.iii.b for details).  B’s 
optimal strategy is as follows.  (1) Accept v  with any probability, , such that 0 , where  is the 
acceptance probability at which the seller is induced to gamble with an offer of  if her cost is low, but below 
which her payoff from gambling is smaller than it is from take-the-sure-thing.  Thus, if , then B’s updated 
belief is b .  (2) Reject if 
+=κminp <op
1y
κ
+
( )1 • 1= [ )++∈ vp ,1 κ , in which case B’s updated belief is the same as his prior, i.e., b ( )1 b0=• , 
because his strategy makes any such offer suboptimal for both seller types, yet both types would consider such an 
offer if B were to accept with sufficiently large probability.  (3) Reject if ( )+− κ,p ( ) 01 =•∈
−p
1p
≤p1
, in which case b  because, 
by Lemma 1, a high cost seller never offers such a price.  (3) Accept if . 
 Consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is high.  First, it is clear that she cannot profit by deviating to a 
higher offer because there is no chance for trade at any price higher than v , while at v  there is a positive 
probability of trade with a positive margin.  It is also clear that it cannot profit the seller to deviate to any 
+ +
[ )++∈ vp ,1 κ , 
as the buyer is certain to reject any such offer.  And by Lemma 1, we know that the seller does not profitably offer 
any  if her cost is high.  Hence, the seller does not profitably deviate from v  if her cost is high. +=< κmin1 pp +
 Next consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is low.  It is clear that she does not profit by deviating to 
any ( )+−∈ vpp ,1  because her payoff from any such offer is ( )δκ−− −+ v0 , which is less than is her payoff from take-
the-sure-thing.  By Lemma 2 we know that she does not deviate to learn-then-discriminate by offering  
because the expected payoff therefrom is smaller than is that from take-the-sure-thing when she is pessimistic.  
Further, because no 
−= pp1
( )−−∈ pvp ,1  is accepted with any greater likelihood than is , but all yield smaller margins, no 
such deviation is profitable.  It is easy to show that when moderately pessimistic, a low cost seller’s expected payoff 
from gambling with an offer of v , which is 
−p
+ ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]δβκκ 011 +−−++ −−+− vyvvvy βδκ 0−+ −+ v 1− , is smaller than is her 
payoff from take-the-sure-thing when ( ) −< y+vy1 , as is the case here.  Hence, the seller does not profitably deviate 
from take-the-sure-thing if her cost is low.  Note that B’s response here is not unique, as any resonse to v  such that +
( ) −+ < yvy1<0  is an equilibrium response. 
 Finally, observe that because B’s response to a high cost seller’s offer is not unique, neither is a high cost 
seller’s updated belief about the buyer if her first period offer, v , is rejected.  It is important, however, that we 
establish the boundaries on her updated belief in the event that her offer is rejected.  In particular, we must show that 
the lower boundary of  is positive, for if it is zero, a high cost seller withdraws from the interaction under the 
belief that she cannot trade with the buyer.  First, because B accepts with positive probability, we know by Bayes’ 
+
( )•1β
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rule that her updated belief must be smaller than her prior, i.e., ( ) 01 ββ <• , if her offer is rejected.  More important, 
however, is to show that if a high cost seller’s first period offer is rejected, her updated belief is positive.  Let  be 
the infimum of a high cost seller’s updated belief if her first period offer of v  is rejected.  We must show that 
.  By Eqn. (A.1) in Appendix 1, we know that a moderately pessimistic high cost seller’s updated belief in the 
event of a rejection is given by 
β&
+
0>β&
( ) ( ) ( )01011 11 βββ yy −−=• , which is a decreasing function of 1.  And because B 
accepts her offer with , the infimum of her updated belief in the event of rejection, , is the value of 
y
β&−< yy1 ( )•1β  
when .  Substituting, we find that −= yy1 ( )[ ]( )δβδ −+
−
−
−
vv
v 0
( )
κκβ −+
−+−+
+−
−+−=
vv
vvv&
− + , which is not positive if 
δ
κ
−+
−
− vκβ −+
−
+−
−≤
vv
v
0
+=κminp ( )δ >κ −
−v
κβ +
−
−=
−p
−v
+
−
+
+
( )+vy1 +
( )1 =•
−≤ p1
+
{=pmin p ,max o
mi
1 pp <
+
−p
−v ( −−∈ pvp ,1
−p
−p
.                                                            (A.13) 
But moderate pessimism means , and  means −≥ ββ0 ( ) δκ κκ +−+
−−
−+
−
+−
−
−+
−
vv
v
vv
0>β&
, 
which means that Cdn. (A.13) cannot hold if the seller is moderately pessimistic.  Therefore, . 
 (iv) Recall that the seller is very optimistic when the following conditions hold.  (1) A low cost seller’s 
expected payoff from playing learn-then-discriminate by offering , which B is certain to accept, exceeds that from 
gambling by offering v , if B accepts v  with probability .  And (2) a high cost seller’s expected payoff from 
offering v  is at least that from offering  if B accepts the former with probability  and the latter with certainty.  
By Lemma 4.ii we know that when the seller is very optimistic, B’s optimal strategy is as follows.  (1) Accept v  
with any probability, 
+ oy
op oy
, such that ( ) ++ < yvy1
−
≤o
p
y , where  is the acceptance probability at which a low cost 
seller’s expected payoff from gambling equals that from playing learn-then-discriminate by offering , but below 
which learn-then-discriminate by offering  dominates gambling.  Thus, on seeing that the offer is , B’s updated 
belief is b .  (2) Accept all 
y
−p
+v
1 ( )+− v,∈ pp1  with probability , in which case B’s updated belief is the same as his 
prior.  (3) Accept if . 
oy
p
 Consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is high.  Again, we know that it does not benefit her to offer any 
price higher than v .  Consider a lower offer.  It cannot benefit her to offer any + [ )∈ vpp ,min1 , where 
} −p+ >κ , as no such price is accepted with greater likelihood and all yield smaller margins.  And, by 
Lemma 1, we know that it cannot benefit the seller to deviate to any n if her cost is high.  Hence, when very 
optimistic, the seller does not profitably deviate from offering v  if her cost is high. 
 If the seller’s cost is low, we know by Lemma 2 that her expected payoff from playing learn-then-
discriminate by offering  in the first period exceeds the payoff that is hers if she takes-the-sure-thing by offering 
 (or any lower price) when she is optimistic.  And because no )  is accepted with greater likelihood than 
is , but all yield smaller margins, she does not profitably deviate to any such offer.  Thus, when very optimistic, a 
low cost seller does not profitably deviate to any price lower than .  Now let us consider the possibility that she 
profits from offering a higher price.  First, it is clear that it is not profitable for her to offer any  since at any +> vp1
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such price there is no chance of trade.  Second, it is easy to show that when very optimistic, a low cost seller’s 
expected payoff from offering , which is −p ( )[ ] ( )( )δβκβδκκ 00 1−−+−+− −−−+−− vvp , exceeds that from gambling 
with an offer of v , which is at most + ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]δ1 + vvy βκβδκκ 010 1 +−−−+−+ −−+−+− vyvv  when ( ) ++ <≤ yvyy 1o , as is the 
case here.  And because no ( )+− vp ,1∈ p  is accepted with any greater likelihood than is , but all yield smaller 
margins, it is not profitable for her to deviate to any such price.  Therefore, if the seller’s cost is low, she does not 
profitably deviate from learn-then-discriminate with an offer of  when she is very optimistic.  Note here that, as in 
part (iii) of this result, the buyer’s response to a high cost seller’s offer is not unique, as any resonse to  such that 
+v
−p
+v
( ) ++ <≤ yvyy 1o  is an equilibrium response. 
+
( )•1β
1y
1y
oy oy
1β
( )•1β
( ) oββ =•1 ( )•1β o
β&& ( )•1β
+y 1y
+y β&&
(( ) ( ) 0>1−− −+ δ−= −+ κβ v&& −v
−β
mip
p +κ opp =min
+≥ κop
−= ββ0
≥op op
op ( ) ] ( )( )δβκβδκκ 00 1−−+−+− −−−+− vvpo
( )δκ−+ v− −
[ 1,01∈λ [ 1,01∈λ
(•1b op λ 1
 Finally, because B’s response to a high cost seller’s offer is not unique, a high cost seller’s updated belief 
about the buyer is likewise not unique if her first period offer, v , is rejected.  We can nonetheless establish the 
boundaries within which her updated belief, , must fall.  Most important is to show that the lower boundary is 
positive since if  is not, then a high cost seller withdraws from the interaction.  First, however, we establish the 
upper boundary.  Recall that  is a decreasing function of , the probability with which B accepts the offer (see 
Eqn. (A.1) in Appendix 1).  Then, because here  is at least as large as  and  is the response such that 
 when the outcome is rejection, it is easy to see that 
( )•
 can be no larger than  if a high cost seller’s 
first period offer is rejected.  To show that a high cost seller’s updated belief is positive if her first period offer is 
rejected, we will show that , the infimum of 
β
 when the seller is very optimistic, is positive.  Because here  
is smaller than , we derive  by substituting  for  in Eqn. (A.1).  After some algebra, we find that 
1y
)
( )0
−
β
v 0
+
βδ
v
v + .     
 
 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.  (i) Recall that  is the initial buyer reputation (equivalently, the initial seller 
belief) at which a low cost seller’s expected payoff from offering n equals that from take-the-sure-thing if B is 
certain to accept min.  Also, recall that  means that .  Hence, if B is certain to accept , then a low 
cost seller’s expected payoff from offering this price is the same as it is from take-the-sure-thing.  Finally, recall that 
when the seller is moderately pessimistic and , B’s optimal strategy is described in the proof of Proposition 
2.i. 
 Given that B’s strategy is precisely the same as is given in the proof of Proposition 2.i, for the same reasons 
that the seller does not profitably deviate if her cost is high there, she does not deviate here if her cost is high.  If the 
seller’s cost is low, deviating to a higher price is not profitable for the same reasons given in the proof of Proposition 
2.i.  But, for a moderately pessimistic low cost seller,  implies that the expected payoff from playing learn-
then-discriminate by offering , which is [ , equals the payoff from take-the-
sure-thing, which is κ−− −v .  She is therefore completely indifferent between these two strategies, and any 
] is optimal.  Note also that the fact that any ] is optimal for the seller if her cost is low affects B’s 
updated belief, ) , on observing an offer of  (specifically, as 1  increases, so does ( )•b  if the offer is ).  And op
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because there is no unique optimal value of 1λ  when , there is no unique value of )b  if the offer is .  We 
can, however, establish the boundaries on the buyer’s updated belief on observing a first period offer of .  Of 
particular importance is the lower boundary of 
−= ββ0 (•1 op
op
( )•1b , for B will accept  if, but only if, b .  Fortunately, it is 
easy to see that for any value of ]
op ( )1 ≥• 0b
[ 1,01∈λ , the buyer’s updated belief, ( )b , is at least as large as his prior, b .  By 
Bayes’ rule, if the observed offer is , then 
•1 0
op ( )b  takes its smallest value if a low cost seller pools with a high cost 
one and offers  with certainty, i.e., if 
•1
0op 1 =λ .  And by definition, if  is a pooling offer, then the buyer’s updated 
belief is the same as his prior on observing it.  In other words, if the first period offer is , then the smallest 
possible value of b  is b .  Hence, B accepts .  It is also important to note that none of this affects B’s updated 
beliefs upon observing offers higher than .  Since either seller type is willing to make such an offer if B accepts 
with sufficiently large probability, on observing any such offer the buyer’s updated belief is still the same as his 
prior.  His optimal response to any  is likewise unchanged: he rejects them.  As a result, if the seller’s cost is 
high, the unique optimal strategy for her is to offer . 
op
op
( )•1 0
++
op
op
opp >1
op
( ) ] ( )(κ 1−− −βoyδκv −+ −+ 0 v+v+
−p
−
( ) ] )(βδκ 0−κ +− 1−−+v− −−p
+
+
)+v−p ++β=β0
[ 1,
+v
−p
1∈η
+
( )•1 1
( )1 0b=•
( ) 11 =•
+ [ ,0b∈
+
oy
 (ii) Recall that  is the initial buyer reputation at which a low cost seller’s expected payoff from gambling 
by offering v , which is 
β
+ [ )δβκ 0oy− − , equals that from playing learn-then-
discriminate by offering , which is [ ( )δβ0κ−+ −v , if B accepts the former with 
probability  and the latter with certainty.  Also note that when the seller is hyper optimistic, B’s optimal strategy is 
as described in the proof of Proposition 2.ii. 
oy
 Given that B’s strategy is the same as in Proposition 2.ii, the same reasons that make it unprofitable for the 
seller to deviate from offering v  if her cost is high also apply here.  If the seller’s cost is low, we use the same 
arguments presented in Proposition 2.ii to show that she does not profitably deviate to any offer higher than v , nor 
any in the interval ( − .  But, as  means that her expected payoff from gambling by offering  equals 
that from learn-then-discriminate by offering , a low cost seller is completely indifferent between these two 
strategies.  Therefore, any ]01∈η  is optimal.  Note that because any [ ]1,0  is an optimal strategy, B’s updated 
belief, b , on observing an offer of v  is affected.  Specifically, because there is no unique optimal value of ( )•1 1η , 
there is also no unique value of b .  But there are boundaries.  At one extreme, if 1 =η , i.e., if a low cost seller 
were certain to pool with a high cost one, then b .  At the other extreme, if 01 =η , i.e., if a low cost seller were 
certain to separate from a high cost one, then b .  Intermediate values of 1η  yield updated buyer beliefs between 
 and 1.  Therefore, if the first period offer is v , we know that 0b ( ) ]b 11 • .  This, however, has no effect on B’s 
strategy, for if he accepts v  with any larger probability than , a low cost seller is no longer indifferent between 
 and , and we encounter the contradictions described in the proof of Corollary 2.  And if he accepts v  with any 
smaller probability than , a high cost seller reduces her offer slighly, and again we encounter the contradictions 
described in the proof of Corollary 2.     
+ oy
+v −p
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